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THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL 
INEQUALITY. By Sandra Lipsitz Bem. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 244. $30. 
A pale eggy yellow background. Circles of different dingy colors 
- murky avocado green, rusty orange, dull burnt sienna, and opaque 
sapphire blue, overlapping in parts to create smoggy brownish colors. 
Is this a dress worn by Marcia Brady circa 1974? A retro Venn dia-
gram? No, it is the cover design of The Lenses of Gender. Sandra 
Lipsitz Bem,1 who was a scholar of androgyny in the 1970s,2 dresses 
her book in androgynous 1970s fashion.3 In this book, she attempts to 
move beyond the concept of 1970s androgyny toward a broader, mod-
em theory of cultural androcentrism, a concept she labels "gender 
schema theory." Her broad-ranging theory encompasses multidis-
ciplinary fields such as biology, psychology, sociology, history, eco-
nomics, politics, and law. In her preface, she acknowledges the risks 
of writing a book with such a comprehensive goal: "Because I poach 
on the domains of other specialists, my rendition of their discourse 
may seem unoriginal; on some occasions, it may not even ring true to 
their ears" (p. ix). Although the book does at times seem unoriginal 
- even somewhat outdated4 - and at times gives cursory treatment 
of vast subjects, Bern does supply a new framework, or at least a new 
vocabulary, for understanding the oppression of women and sexual 
minorities. 
The title of the book gives us the first component of Bern's new 
vocabulary- the three "lenses of gender." According to Bem, we see 
the world through various "lenses," which are "hidden assumptions 
about sex and gender [that] remain embedded in cultural discourses, 
1. Professor of Psychology and Women's Studies, Cornell University. 
2. See p. viii; see, e.g., Sandra Lipsitz Bern, On the Utility of Alternative Procedures for Assess-
ing Psychological Androgyny, 45 J. CoNSULTING & CLINICAL PsYCHOL. 196 (1977) [hereinafter 
Bern, Utility]; Sandra Lipsitz Bern, Sex Role Adaptability: One Consequence of Psychological 
Androgyny, 31 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 634 (1975); Sandra Lipsitz Bern, The Measure-
ment of Psychological Androgyny, 42 J. CoNSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 155 (1974) [herein-
after Bern, The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny]. 
3. This is in contrast to the many recent "women's books" that come dressed in feminine 
colors, such as pinks, lavenders, purples, and burgundies. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, 
VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcONOMICS (1993) (mauve and lavender); RENEE R. ANSPACH, DECID-
ING WHO LIVES: FATEFUL CHOICES IN THE INTENSIVE-CARE NURSERY (1993) (lavender and 
rose); ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988) (burgundy). But see 
ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE COLOR OF GENDER: REIMAGING DEMOCRACY (1994) (play-fig-
ure woman dressed in blue, red, fuchsia, mustard, and black, but wearing a dress). 
4. Bern's theory, especially the lens of androcentrism, seems particularly outdated and uno-
riginal when compared with Catharine MacKinnon's work over the past fifteen years. In this 
book, however, Bern adds her significant psychological work on gender schematicity and androg-
yny to MacKinnon's sociolegal theories, thus giving a psychological framework to what legal 
scholars would otherwise recognize as MacKinnon's dominance theory. See infra note 6. 
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social institutions, and individual psyches" (p. 2). These lenses are (i) 
androcentrism, (ii) gender polarization, and (iii) biological essential-
ism. She calls them "lenses" because we are raised with them and we 
assume that we are seeing the only possible reality when we look 
through them, but if we learn to remove the lenses, we can see a differ-
ent construction of reality.5 The lenses of gender are problematic be-
cause they "invisibly and systemically reproduce male power in 
generation after generation" (p. 2). One of the goals of Bem's book is 
to teach us to recognize the lenses of gender in ourselves, thus enabling 
us to look at the lenses of gender rather than through them. This abil-
ity requires a "raised social consciousness" (p. 1) that allows us to 
recognize the ways in which gender as a social construction shapes our 
views of social reality. Exposing the lenses of gender, Bern argues, will 
transform the sex equality movement (p. 176). The end result of this 
raised consciousness, to which Bern aspires, would be a shift in the 
feminist debate away from the focus on differences between men and 
women, and toward a focus on the way in which "androcentric social 
institutions transform male-female difference into female disadvan-
tage" (p. 177). As Bern acknowledges (pp. xi, 183-84), feminist legal 
scholar Catharine MacKinnon has been making this same argument 
since the late 1970s.6 
S. Bern describes the effects of our enculturation in the following way: 
[T]he hallmark of a native consciousness is not being able to distinguish between reality and 
the way one's culture construes reality; in other words, the reality one perceives and the 
cultural lenses through which one perceives it are "indissoluble." • • • [T]he child growing 
up within a culture is thus like the proverbial fish who is unaware that its environment is 
wet. After all, what else could it be? 
P. 140 (quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, "From the Native's Point of View''..- On the Nature of An· 
thropological Understanding. in LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE AN· 
THROPOLOGY SS, SS (1983)). 
6. Bern's shift from difference to androcentrism parallels MacKinnon's shift from difference 
to dominance. For example, in one of her more recent works, MacKinnon writes: "In this 
approach, inequality is a matter not of sameness and difference, but of dominance and subordina-
tion ..•. Keeping the reality of gender in view makes it impossible to see gender as a difference 
•.•• " CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMIN15f THEORY OF THE STATE 242-43 
(1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINl5f THEORY OF THE STATE]. See generally 
id. at 21S-49; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Introduction: The Art of the Impossible [hereinafter 
MACKINNON, Art of the Impossible], in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 1, 8-10 (1987); CATHARINE 
MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance [hereinafter MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance], 
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra, at 32. She also writes, "If you follow my shift in perspective 
from gender as difference to gender as dominance, gender changes from a distinction that is 
presumptively valid to a detriment that is presumptively suspect. The difference approach tries 
to map reality; the dominance approach tries to challenge and change it." Id. at 44. In an earlier 
work, she notes, 
It is as much the social creation of differences, and the transformation of differences into 
social advantages and disadvantages, upon which inequality can rationally be predicated •••. 
Sex discrimination is treated as a logical and necessary outgrowth of a social whole in 
which the human sex difference has been transformed into a systematic social inequality -
for the benefit of some, to the detriment of others. 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN lOS, 126·27 (1979) 
[hereinafter MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT]. See generally id. at 101-41. 
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The first lens of gender is androcentrism, or male-centeredness (pp. 
39-79): 
[A]ndrocentrism is the privileging of male experience and the "otheriz-
ing" of female experience; that is, males and male experience are treated 
as a neutral standard or norm for the culture or the species as a whole, 
and females and female experience are treated as a sex-specific deviation 
from that allegedly universal standard. [p. 41] 
Bern surveys various cultural discourses - theology, philosophy, psy-
chology, and law - pointing out the androcentrism in each area. Her 
analysis of equal rights law (pp. 62-79) reads like the text to an intro-
ductory undergraduate course on the history of women and the law. 
She easily flips through the infamous early cases - Bradwell v. 11/i-
nois 1 and Muller v. Oregon 8 - the leading 1970s equality cases -
Reed v. Reed, 9 Frontiero v. Richardson, 1° Craig v. Boren, 11 Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 12 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 13 and Personnel Administrator 
v. Feeney 14 - and the "comparable worth" case - AFSCME v. 
Washington. 15 The last case, AFSCME v. Washington, is the only case 
she cites that was decided after the 1970s. Bern gives cursory treat-
ment to the cases and to the feminist strategies that went into them, 
using the cases only to prove her point - that the law is androcentric. 
Bern also criticizes the predominant feminist legal strategy that framed 
the 1970s cases - gender neutrality - without mentioning the expan-
sive debate over the issue, through which many feminists have come to 
the conclusion that gender neutrality is not the best feminist legal 
strategy.16 Put simply, Bern chooses an easy target and then makes it 
look even easier. Although the cases she cites clearly do demonstrate 
androcentrism in the legal system, she could have added dimension to 
the examples by expounding on the feminist discourse that went into 
the cases and came after them and by drawing on some of the more 
recent controversial focal areas of feminist legal strategy, such as sexu-
ality, sexual harassment, pornography, prostitution, surrogacy, incest, 
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.} 130 (1873); see pp. 66-68. 
8. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see pp. 67-70. 
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see pp. 70-71. 
10. 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see pp. 71-73. 
11. 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see pp. 72-73. 
12. 417 U.S. 484 (1974); see pp. 74-77. 
13. 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see pp. 74-77. 
14. 442 U.S. 256 (1979); see p. 77. 
15. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); see pp 77-78. 
16. See, e.g., MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 6, at 33-34; MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 6, at 106-18; Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy, 
Introduction to FEMINISf LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 1, 5.7 (Katharine 
T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersec-
tion of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory 
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 
MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Cul-
ture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982). 
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battery, and rape. Overall, however, Bern's discussion of androcentr-
ism proves, to anyone who has not already figured it out, that our 
institutions and fields of thought are defined and function from a male 
point of view. 
The second lens is gender polarization (pp. 80-132), or "the ubiqui-
tous organization of social life around the distinction between male 
and female" (p. 80). This lens polarizes men and women so that we 
appear to have vast differences in many aspects of life, such as biology, 
modes of dress, social roles, emotions, and sexual desires (p. 2). This 
lens is also the reason why people generally perceive that there are 
only two sexes.17 Bern begins her analysis of gender polarization by 
focusing on the way in which scientists have contributed to gender 
polarization by stigmatizing homosexuality as a sexual "deviation.,, 
She examines the late-nineteenth-century concept of sexual inversion, 
Freud's views on homosexuality, and American psychiatrists' patho-
logizing of homosexuality (pp. 87-101). She concludes that homosex-
ual oppression is a result of gender polarization and compulsory 
heterosexuality .18 
Bern then analyzes scientific studies that focus on what she calls 
the "nonsexual" masculinity-femininity of the individual psyche -
"the assessment of masculinity-femininity, the treatment and preven-
tion of masculinity-femininity disorders, especially 'transsexualism,' 
and the development of masculinity-femininity in 'normal' children" 
(pp. 101-02). At this point, Bern includes the results of an interesting 
study she did to test children's understanding of gender as a biological 
concept.19 Bern showed fifty-eight children (three-, four-, and five-
year-olds) a photograph of a nude toddler. She then asked the chil-
dren to identify the sex of that same toddler in two other pictures -
one in which the toddler is dressed in a sex-consistent way, and one in 
which the toddler is cross-dressed.20 The children's responses to the 
test showed whether they understood that gender is based on genitalia 
or whether they thought that gender is based on dress or hairstyle. 
Sixty percent of the children in the study misidentified the gender of 
the toddler, failing the test.21 Bern argues that this lack of biological 
gender knowledge leads to gender traditionalism and gender polariza-
tion because children grow up thinking that there are certain things 
that they must do in order to be male or female. Bern explains: 
17. P. 80; see also MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 
6, at 233 ("Sex in nature is not a bipolarity, it is a continuum; society makes it into a 
bipolarity."). 
18. P. 101. See generally Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 
5 SIGNS 631 (1980). 
19. Sandra Lipsitz Bern, Genital Knowledge and Gender Constancy in Preschool Children, 60 
CHILD DEV. 649 (1989); see pp. 115-17. 
20. See pp. 116-17 (reprinting photographs used in the study). 
21. Bern, supra note 19, at 660-62. 
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As I see it, the legacy of learning a social definition of sex lasts long 
after a child has learned about the special significance of the genitalia as 
the defining attributes of male and female. Not only does the social defi-
nition set up a pattern of behavior that is culturally consistent with 
whatever sex the child is told he or she is; it also instills in the child the 
never-to-be-fully-forgotten feeling that being male or female is something 
to work at, to accomplish, and to be sure not to lose, rather than some-
thing one is biologically. [p. 148] 
Bern concludes that much of the previous psychological and psy-
chiatric discourse contributes to gender polarization by privileging 
gender traditionalism and pathologizing gender "deviance" according 
to cultural standards (p. 115). Bern and other feminist psychologists 
began to challenge this discourse in the 1970s. Bern originally focused 
on the area of androgyny but soon came to recognize the limitations of 
that concept as a vehicle for social and political change. Feminist the-
orists at the time criticized the concept of androgyny as being "simul-
taneously so gender neutral, so utopian, and so devoid of any real 
connection to historical reality that it doesn't even acknowledge the 
existence of gender inequality" (p. 123). They also criticized androg-
yny for being "too private and too personal . . . to be of any value 
politically" and for reproducing the gender polarity that it sought to 
undercut.22 Bern herself, while clinging to the idea that androgyny has 
value as a vision of utopia (p. 124), has shifted the focus of her re-
search from androgyny to the concept of gender schematicity (p. 125). 
Bern best defines and explains the gender schema theory for schol-
ars outside the field of psychology in her article, Gender Schema The-
ory and Its Implications for Child Development: Raising Gender-
aschematic Children in a Gender-schematic Society. 23 Gender schema 
theory provides an explanation for "sex typing," or the way in which 
children become masculine or feminine by acquiring sex-appropriate 
preferences, skills, personality attributes, behaviors, and self-con-
cepts.24 "[G]ender schema theory proposes that sex typing derives in 
large measure from gender-schematic processing, from a generalized 
readiness on the part of the child to encode and to organize informa-
tion - including information about the self - according to the cul-
ture's definitions of maleness and femaleness."25 Bern explains that 
children learn society's cultural definitions of maleness and femaleness 
as a schema.26 Sex typing results as children internalize the schema 
22. P. 123. For a critique of androgyny from a legal perspective, see Christine A. Littleton, 
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 15 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1292-95 (1987). 
23. Sandra Lipsitz Bern, Gender Schema Theory and Its Implications for Child Development: 
Raising Gender-aschematic Children in a Gender-schematic Society, 8 SIGNS 598 (1983). 
24. Id. at 598. 
25. Id. at 603. 
26. Bern defines schema as: 
a cognitive structure, a network of associations that organizes and guides an individual's 
perception. A schema functions as an anticipatory structure, a readiness to search for and 
1934 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1929 
and develop a gendered self-concept, thus becoming gender schematic 
without even realizing it (p. 125). Once children internalize the gen-
der schema, they begin to evaluate themselves on the basis of gendered 
criteria. 27 
[T]he child also learns to evaluate his or her adequacy as a person ac-
cording to the gender schema . . . . The gender schema becomes a pre-
scriptive standard or guide, and self-esteem becomes its hostage. Here, 
then, enters an internalized motivational factor that prompts an individ-
ual to regulate his or her behavior so that it conforms to cultural defini-
tions of femaleness and maleness. Thus do cultural myths become self-
fulfilling prophecies, and thus, according to gender schema theory, do we 
arrive at the phenomenon known as sex typing. 28 
Once the child becomes sex typed, he or she will sort information and 
make decisions based on gender classifications and on the schema's 
definitions of what is appropriate masculinity or femininity, rather 
than on other factors that could work equally well (pp. 125-27). 
Bern expands on the gender schema theory in The Lenses of Gen-
der (pp. 125-27, 138-75). She takes her original gender schema theory 
and adds to it the lens of androcentrism. She also places new emphasis 
on how the process of enculturation transfers the gender schema from 
the culture to the individual psyche (p. 139). This theory explains how 
and why men and women in our society become androcentric and gen-
der-polarizing themselves and then unwittingly collaborate in the re-
production of male power.29 
The third lens is biological essentialism, which works to rationalize 
the other two lenses by claiming that there is a clear biological reason 
for all the differences between men and women (pp. 2, 6-38). Bern 
to assimilate incoming information in schema-relevant terms. Schematic information 
processing is thus highly selective and enables the individual to impose structure and mean-
ing onto a vast array of incoming stimuli. More specifically, schematic information process-
ing entails a readiness to sort information into categories on the basis of some particular 
dimension, despite the existence of other dimensions that could serve equally well in this 
regard. 
Id. at 603-04. 
27. In order to identify such sex-typed individuals, Bern created the Bern Sex Role Inventory 
(BSRI). See pp. 118-20; Bern, Utility, supra note 2, at 196-97; Bern, The Measurement of 
Psychological Androgyny, supra note 2. The BSRI contains a list of positive personality charac-
teristics, some that are considered "masculine" - for example, assertiveness and independence 
- and some that are considered "feminine" - for example, tenderness and understanding -
according to American cultural definitions of sex appropriateness. The person taking the BSRI 
indicates how well each of the personality characteristics describes himself or herself. After the 
BSRI is scored, the person receives a Masculinity Score and a Femininity Score. If the Masculin-
ity Score is higher, the person is said to have a masculine sex role; if the Femininity Score is 
higher, the person is said to have a feminine sex role. If the Masculinity and the Femininity 
Scores are approximately equal, then the person is said to have an androgynous sex role. Pp. 
119-20; Bern, Utility, supra note 2, at 197. 
28. Bern, supra note 23, at 604-05 (footnote omitted). 
29. See also MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at 
230 ("The distinction between women and men is not simply etched onto perceived reality, but 
superimposed on a picture that already exists in the mind because it exists in the social world."). 
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places this section first in her book because "W estem culture has for 
so long analyzed almost all issues related to women and men in terms 
of biological difference that this cultural concern with biology must be 
laid to rest before I can go on with my story" (pp. 3-4). Bern points 
out the way in which science has worked "to rationalize and legitimize 
the sexual status quo" throughout history and through recent sociobi-
ological theories (p. 6). She criticizes sociobiologists and biopsycholo-
gists for underestimating the influence of culture and situational 
context on the individual and for overestimating the importance of the 
individual's biology. Bern then offers her own biohistorical account of 
sexual difference and sexual inequality. She theorizes that men and 
women developed a gendered division of labor in hunter-gatherer soci-
eties because women had to deal with the biological reality of being 
pregnant or breastfeeding for most of their adult lives. Men, who were 
responsible for defense and hunting, developed male-dominated polit-
ical institutions, while women were busy raising children and doing 
whatever other productive activities they could do with children 
"either in them or on them" (p. 31). The big question, according to 
Bern, is why these inequalities still exist, given that in technologically 
advanced societies women are no longer constrained by their fertility. 
She concludes that history has so firmly entrenched male political 
dominance that modem cultural institutions continue to enforce the 
division of labor through seemingly neutral means - for example, by 
making it extremely difficult in our society to be both a parent and a 
worker in the paid labor force (pp. 32-33). Bern succinctly states her 
final opinion on the biology issue: "[N]o matter what subtle biological 
differences there may someday prove to be between women and men 
on the average, those differences will never justify the sexual inequality 
that has, for centuries, been a feature of human social life."30 
One main criticism of The Lenses of Gender is that Bern rarely 
discusses the development of women's sexuality, especially through 
sexual abuse, as a part of the gender schema leading to women's ine-
quality. She gives a cursory discussion of marital rape (p. 145), vio-
lence against women (p. 163), and the eroticization of sexual 
inequality (pp. 163-64), and she briefly lists prostitution, stripping, and 
go-go dancing as "women's jobs" (p. 144). The omission of a more 
detailed discussion of the development of women's sexuality, however, 
is somewhat odd considering the prominence of the idea that inequal-
ity on the basis of sexuality is a major part of gender inequality.31 
30. P. 38; cf. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 6. 
To the extent that the biology of one sex is a social disadvantage, while the biology of the 
other is not, or is a social advantage, the sexes are equally different but not equally powerful. 
The issue becomes the social meaning of biology, not any facticity or object quality of biol-
ogy itself. 
Id. at 232. 
31. See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? 261-63 (1991); 
MACKINNON, SEXUAL lIARAssMENT, supra note 6; Kimberle Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Any-
1936 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1929 
Catharine MacKinnon theorizes: 
Sexuality, then, is a form of power. Gender, as socially constructed, 
embodies it, not the reverse. Women and men are divided by gender, 
made into the sexes as we know them, by the social requirements of 
heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and fe-
male sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is the linchpin of gender 
inequality. 32 
Bem does give considerable attention to compulsory heterosexuality as 
a form of gender inequality, but in general she centers her theory 
around the problems surrounding childbearing, childrearing, and 
equality in the workplace. Yet the socialization of women as sexual 
beings would fit nicely into Bern's gender schema theory, helping to 
explain why women are such frequent victims of men's sexual oppres-
sion. As MacKinnon explains it, the socialization of women leads wo-
men to internalize men's image of sexuality, which is exactly what 
Bem says women do with other aspects of becoming socially appropri-
ate, feminine women. MacKinnon explains: "Gender socialization is 
the process through which women come to identify themselves as sex-
ual beings, as beings that exist for men. It is that process through 
which women internalize (make their own) a male image of their sexu-
ality as their identity as women. It is not just an illusion."33 
An interesting addition to Bern's book would have been a more 
thorough analysis of how the gendered socialization of men and wo-
men contributes to rape, sexual harassment, prostitution, pornogra-
phy, and violence against women. For example, Bern's theory of 
women's internalization of the gender schema could have an impact 
on a sexual harassment trial in which the defense argues that the wo-
man "asked for it" by wearing traditionally gendered clothing - a 
tight short skirt, spiked heels, and so on. In the first place, Bern's 
theory could explain why women dress the way they do based on sex 
typing. 34 More important, Bern's theory could be useful for analyzing 
way? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDER-
ING POWER 402, 407-16 (foni Morrison ed., 1992); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist 
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REv. 387, 394-96 (1984); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The 
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
589, 604-10 {1986); Wendy W. Williams, supra note 16, at 179-90 {discussing women's sexuality 
and statutory rape laws). 
32. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for 
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 533 {1982) (footnote omitted). 
33. Id. at 530-31 (footnote omitted). 
34. Cf. DUNCAN KENNEDY, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domina-
tion, in SEXY DRESSING ETC. 126, 162-213 (1993). Kennedy quotes a letter to the editor in 
response to a controversial newspaper article about sexual harassment: 
"Enjoying what one wears is one thing, but many misguided women dress provocatively to 
seek attention and approval from men, not necessarily their advances. Men are told that 
such outfits are a signal that advances are welcome. Why, after all, would any sane person 
dress that way for her own comfort or pleasure?" 
Id. at 177 (quoting Janice Zazinski, Letter to the Editor, On the Clothes Women Wear to Work. 
BosroN GLOBE, Jan. 25, 1992, at 22). 
May 1994] Law and Equality 1937 
juries. Because both men and women on the jury presumably form 
opinions of witnesses based on the results of gender schematicity, a 
lawyer could attempt to present expert testimony explaining to the 
jurors the way in which their own sex typing plays an improper role in 
jury deliberations. Jurors tend to blame women for the way they 
dress35 and may not believe a "sexy dressing" woman when she testi-
fies that harassing conduct was unwelcome. Bern's theory, however, 
could explain to the jury both what was going on when the harassment 
occurred and why the jurors themselves may believe certain untrue 
things about the witnesses due to gender schematicity. 
Bern's theory could also have an application for rape and domestic 
violence cases. Properly developed and convincingly presented 
through expert testimony, this is the type of theory that could replace 
the much-criticized battered woman syndrome and rape trauma syn-
drome. 36 By stressing the way the jurors themselves make decisions 
based on gender schematicity, attorneys could lead the focus of such a 
defense away from what is wrong with the victim and toward what is 
wrong with the way jurors make gendered decisions in deliberations. 37 
Bern places herself into the feminist debate over the use of various 
strategies for gender equality (pp. 127-32, 177-96). She criticizes both 
the gender neutrality strategy of the 1970s - the sameness approach, 
or gender minimizers - and the woman-centered approach of the 
1980s - the difference approach, or gender maximizers. Bern criti-
cizes the gender neutrality approach for its narrow-mindedness (pp. 
177-85). She maintains that by claiming to be the same as men, wo-
men set themselves up for disaster in areas where women are different, 
particularly in pregnancy. She also criticizes the sameness approach 
for helping only those women who need it the least - those who are 
"similarly situated" to men (p. 179). The 1980s glorification of wo-
men's differences was a backlash against the 1970s focus on gender 
neutrality, androgyny, and women as victims. 
Bern's critique of the 1980s approach clearly outlines the various 
gender-maximizing theories - the biologically essentialist approach 
35. See, e.g., id. at 176 ("[M]any women perceive violating the dress code in the direction of 
being 'too sexy' as creating a particular risk of persistent propositions, unwanted touching, sug-
gestive remarks, exhibitionism, obscene phone calls, and the like .... "). 
36. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work 
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battery, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986). In fact, 
Bern's critique of androgyny is similar to critiques of the battered woman syndrome and the rape 
trauma syndrome in that androgyny focuses too much on the personal rather than the political, 
thus diverting attention away from more useful strategies. Compare pp. 123-24 with Schneider, 
supra, at 212-22 and Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric 
Labeling, and the Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994). See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., 
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (balding that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment trial need not 
prove serious psychological injury, as "[s]uch an inquiry may needlessly focus the factfinder's 
attention on concrete psychological harm, an element Title VII does not require"). 
37. See generally Stefan, supra note 36. 
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espoused by Adrienne Rich and Mary Daly; the child development 
approach seen in the work of Evelyn Fox Keller, Carol Gilligan, and 
Nancy Chodorow; and the social psychological approach seen in the 
work of Jean Baker Miller, Sarah Ruddick, Dorothy Smith, Hilary 
Rose, Bettina Aptheker, Nancy Hartsock, and Sandra Harding (pp. 
129-30). Although Bern commends the 1980s theorists for pulling the 
feminist discourse away from gender neutrality and victimization by 
exposing social oppression and patriarchy, she criticizes them for re-
producing the lenses of gender polarization and biological essentialism 
(p. 130). She argues that the woman-centered approach is simply the 
flip side of current gender polarization, but with men rather than wo-
men being denigrated, which still leaves us with the politically danger-
ous idea that there are vast "natural" differences between men and 
women. 38 MacKinnon points out the political danger of this ap-
proach: "When difference means dominance as it does with gender, 
for women to affirm differences is to affirm the qualities and character-
istics of powerlessness."39 
Bern addresses several other key feminist legal debates in her book. 
She comments on the controversial strategy of "special protection" 
through protectivist legislation (p. 178). She exposes errors in the ar-
gument that women "choose" inequality by opting for lower-paying 
jobs and childrearing instead of "men's" careers - the argument that 
prevailed in the so-called comparable worth cases (pp. 177-78). One 
area of feminism that Bern unfortunately skims over is multiple con-
sciousness (pp. 182, 187, 191). Multiple consciousness seeks to make 
feminism more inclusive by moving to the center those experiences of 
women who are traditionally marginalized within the feminist move-
ment, usually on the basis of race, class, sexual orientation, or disabil-
ity. 40 Bern raises the issue of women's differences in one paragraph, 
and then, "[t]hese female-female differences notwithstanding," she de-
fends the feminist struggle as valid (p. 182). She begins her next para-
graph "[w]ith that said," as if the issues of racism, classism, 
homophobia, and disability among feminists only merit two 
paragraphs of discussion (p. 182). Once again, it appears that Bern 
could use her schema theory to encompass these issues. Along with 
the gender schema, are we not also raised with a racial schema, a class 
schema, a physical ability schema? 
38. See MACKINNON, Art of the Impossible, supra note 6, at 3 ("To treat gender as a differ· 
ence ..• means to treat it as a bipolar distinction, each pole of which is defined in contrast to the 
other by opposed intrinsic attributes .••• The idea of gender difference helps keep the reality of 
male dominance in place."). 
39. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at 51. 
40. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-1990); Crenshaw, supra note 16; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essential-
ism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. R.Ev. 581 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First 
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 
(1989). 
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Bem promotes a unified feminist movement as the best policy goal 
without truly examining the ways in which her theory could be of 
further, more inclusive use. For example, what happens to her exam-
ple of the incompatibility of work and childrearing when we consider 
cultures with large extended families who share in the childrearing? 
In what ways do androcentrism and gender polarization work with 
racism to create unique problems for women of color?41 What hap-
pens to those women who are raised to be gender schematic in our 
society but never can reach anything close to the gender "ideal" of 
beauty because they are disabled, overweight, or not white?42 In what 
ways does gender schematicity encourage sex-typed women to "other-
ize" women who do not exemplify the traditional gender ideal? Bern's 
theory of enculturation could provide an interesting framework for an-
alyzing these issues. 
Bern devotes serious attention to the issues of compulsory hetero-
sexuality and homophobia. The issues surrounding homosexuality are 
clearly an integral part of her gender schema theory. Bern exposes the 
sexism inherent in homophobia,43 especially in her comparison of the 
terms sissy and tomboy. As children, girls are allowed to cross gender 
boundaries much more readily than boys are, which is evident "in the 
merciless teasing of sissies, as opposed to the benign neglect or even 
open admiration of tomboys. "44 Bem illustrates this asymmetry with 
the following example: 
[A]lthough a girl can now wear almost any item of clothing and play 
with almost any toy without so much as an eyebrow being raised by her 
social community, let a boy even once have the urge to try on a princess 
costume in the dress-up comer of his nursery school, and his parents and 
teachers will instantly schedule a conference to discuss the adequacy of 
his gender identity. [p. 150] 
Bern points out that men are held to a nearly unattainable goal of 
becoming "real men." In order to come close to that ideal, Bern ar-
gues, men dominate women as a way of feeling powerful, privileged, 
and masculine (pp. 150-51). 
41. See generally RACE-ING JUS'fICE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 31. 
42. See generally TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE (1970); NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY 
MYTH (1991). 
43. See also John Stoltenberg, Gays and the Propomography Movement: Having the Hots for 
Sex Discrimination, in MEN CoNFRONT PORNOGRAPHY 248 (Michael s. Kimmel ed., 1991). 
Those of us who are queer have a fairly obvious special interest in ending sex discrimina-
tion, because homophobia is both a consequence of sex discrimination and an enforcer of sex 
discrimination. The system of male supremacy requires gender polarity - with real men as 
different from real women as they can be, and with men's social superiority to women ex-
pressed in public and in private in every way imaginable. Homophobia is, in part, how the 
system punishes those who deviate and seem to dissent from it. ..• Homophobia is central 
to the maintenance of sex discrimination. 
Id. at 251. 
44. P. 150. For a grown-up example of this, compare any of the male figure skaters or ice 
dancers with Bonnie Blair. 
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Bern's view of homophobia is politically useful: "[A]s much as the 
fear or abhorrence of homosexuality may be a psychological problem 
for many individuals, that fear or abhorrence is created by an institu-
tional and ideological emphasis on gender polarization and compul-
sory heterosexuality" (p. 101). Bem objects to homophobia as a 
concept that treats homosexual oppression as an individual pathologi-
cal condition rather than as a social institution of oppression. This is 
another area where Bem could have drawn on more recent events and 
political strategies. For example, how does her theory work with the 
current debate within the homosexual community of assimilation ver-
sus separatism? How would her strategy have contributed to the Clin-
ton administration's decision to press "gays in the military" as its first 
homosexual rights issue? How could her theory be used in the homo-
sexual rights cases that are making their way toward the U.S. Supreme 
Court?45 How might her theory convince voters in Colorado and 
other states not to support laws opposing homosexual rights?46 
Another concern with Bern's analysis of homosexuality is why she 
omitted a serious discussion of the differences between lesbians and 
gay men, especially in light of her heavy reliance on Adrienne Rich 
(pp. 40, 99, 121-23, 129). One of Rich's main arguments is that 
"[l]esbians have historically been deprived of a political existence 
through 'inclusion' as female versions of male homosexuality. To 
equate lesbian existence with male homosexuality because each is stig-
matized is to deny and erase female reality once again."47 Similarly, 
Sandra Harding points out how a distinctive lesbian epistemological 
standpoint exposes androcentrism. 48 Bem mentions this issue briefly 
in a parenthetical note as part of a discussion of the vocabulary of the 
"gay" rights movement (p. 172), but she never returns to it. After 
Bem devotes such attention to sissies and tomboys, one would have 
expected a more thorough analysis of the political ramifications of 
combining the lesbian rights movement with the gay rights movement 
in such an androcentric, gender-polarizing society.49 For example, 
gay men are not exempt from many of the privileges of an androcen-
tric society just because they are in the sexual minority.50 
45. See Joan Biskupic, Gay Rights Activists Seek a Supreme Court Test Case, WASH. Posr, 
Dec. 19, 1993, at Al. 
46. See Valerie Richardson, Tough Challenges in Courts Stymie Gay Rights Backlash, WASH. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1993, at Al. 
47. Rich, supra note 18, at 649. 
48. See HARDING, supra note 31, at 249-67. 
49. See RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (Our)LAW 11-26 (1992). "Feminist legal theorists 
also conceptualize lesbians with 'their men,' i.e., gay men. Astonishing in a discipline that dis-
sects gender in evecy other aspect of life is the absence of a gendered perspective regarding sexual 
orientation. For feminist legal scholars, gay men and lesbians is a single term." Id. at 22. 
50. Some commentators have argued, as a matter of fact, that the gay male movement may 
even be contributing to the subordination of women by supporting the pornography industry. 
See, e.g., Stoltenberg, supra note 43. 
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A final issue in this area that Bern could have explored further is 
homosexuality as an identity. Bern claims that the politicizing of gay 
and lesbian identities has been empowering but may be a historically 
and culturally created fiction. She modifies this statement by ceding 
that "they are fictions that come to have psychological reality if they 
are institutionalized by the dominant culture" (p. 175). Given the 
political and personal importance of homosexuality as an identity, 
Bern could have expanded more on this idea. 51 
Bern's writing style is clear and conversational, making the subject 
she discusses appear deceptively easy. She seems serious about teach-
ing her theories to the reader and about establishing a friendly rapport, 
simplifying her language at points rather than attempting to impress 
the reader with technical jargon. Throughout the book, Bern inter-
sperses her theory with quirky personal facts and stories. One of the 
best stories Bern tells is about her son Jeremy: 
Jeremy ... naively decided to wear barrettes to nursery school. Several 
times that day, another little boy insisted that Jeremy must be a girl 
because "only girls wear barrettes." After repeatedly insisting that 
"wearing barrettes doesn't matter; being a boy means having a penis and 
testicles," Jeremy finally pulled down his pants to make his point more 
convincingly. The other boy was not impressed. He simply said, "Ev-
erybody has a penis; only girls wear barrettes." [p. 149] 
In her own family, she tried to teach her children at the earliest possi-
ble age that "being a boy means having a penis and testicles; being a 
girl means having a vagina, a clitoris, and a uterus; and whether you're 
a boy or a girl, a man or a woman, doesn't need to matter unless and 
until you want to make a baby" (p. 149). 
These stories, somewhat unexpected in a serious work by a leading 
authority in gender roles, are actually a delight to run across. They 
are engaging, making Bern appear human and personable. By showing 
us how she and her family have been affected by the social construc-
tion of gender roles, she encourages us to question our own daily ex-
periences through the framework of her theory. This rapport is 
particularly comforting in light of the sections of the book that may 
lead her readers to question their own gender identities or the way in 
which they have contributed to the creation of traditionally gendered 
identities in their own children. 52 
In Bern's life and work, she attempts to promote gender subver-
siveness. Her vision of a feminist utopia would be a world in which 
51. See generally Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Dis-
course, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 324 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). 
52. See, e.g;, pp. 133-75 ("The Construction of Gender Identity"). Bern specifically asks us 
to reconsider our personal psyches in her conclusion to the book. "Gender depolarization would 
also require a psychological revolution in our most personal sense of who and what we are as 
males and females, a profound alteration in our feelings about the meaning of our biological sex 
and its relation to our psyche and our sexuality." P. 196. 
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people look at one another, not primarily as "men" and "women," but 
as human (p. 196). The question at this point is whether others can 
use Bern's theories to reach that utopia. Bern's gender schema theory 
may have great potential in the legal field - a potential that Bern, who 
is not a legal scholar, does not develop. In this fashion, Bern's theories 
may have made it out of the 1970s, and the 1990s may yet have a use 
for them. 
- Jill M. Dahlmann 
